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Patriarchal Dominion and the Politics of the Between
Christopher P. Long
Praise neither the life of anarchy, nor that of  despotic
rule, god has given power in all things to the in-
between, though he governs at one time one way at
another, another.
—Aeschylus1
From its very beginnings, patriarchal dominion has always estab-
lished its authority and won legitimacy by a subversion of the feminine
that arises out of an implicit recognition of feminine power. Swallowing
Metis, Zeus secures the stable order of his divine rule; sacrificing
Iphigenia, Agamemnon asserts his authority as sovereign; denying the
Erinyes their vengeance, Athena founds the human community that
bears her name. Each of these stories articulates a dimension of the
tragic dialectic of patriarchal dominion: a feminine power is subverted
in a foundational act of decision designed to establish and consolidate
patriarchal authority; this act of subversion then wins legitimacy by
repression as it is designated inevitable and identified with the natural
order of things.
Yet, the structure of this dialectic is tragic, animated by the attempt
to control the very excess that conditions its own possibility. The origi-
nal act of subversion and its subsequent repression is accomplished by
a transformative political intelligence known as j´qft, which carries
the sense of cunning, deception and craftiness as much as that of wise
counsel and political acumen. The patriarchy itself depends upon the
habit of thinking it most needs to control. But Metis does not submit
quietly to the appropriations of the patriarch; she remains operative
and effective, underlying and undermining the structure and stability
of the patriarchy itself. She lives in the figure of her daughter, Athena,
born from the very head of her father as the intractable upsurge of
power that emerges from that original act of consumption by which
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Zeus seeks to consolidate his authority. What the story of Athena’s
birth inaugurates, the story of her actions transforms; for in her ulti-
mate attempt to establish a place of justice for humans, she turns deci-
sively against the masculine logic of force to a logic of persuasion and
respect, a logic, indeed, of a certain transformative habit of thinking,
itself a j´qft directed toward justice and designed to open a space for
the possibility of genuine human flourishing.
Turning again to these ancient stories, to the very language in which
patriarchal authority first comes to expression and by which it seeks its
first legitimation, will uncover the mythic origins of patriarchal domin-
ion and the tragic dialectic according to which it operates. Yet to dis-
cern the transformative effects of j´qft and the possibilities it holds for
a different politics, it will be necessary to undertake a phenomenology
of the things said, a ‘legomenology’ that allows the things said to speak
for themselves and in so speaking to articulate not only the tragic
dialectic of patriarchal dominion, but also the voice of another possibil-
ity for politics, one rooted in the transformative capacity of words.
What we make of these words must be informed by what they have
already made of us. 
Listen then, again, first to the story of Zeus and Metis.
1. Zeus and Metis: Intimations of Another Politics
The dialectic of patriarchal dominion begins always with a certain
recognition. In Hesiod’s Theogony, Metis is introduced as “she who
knows most [mibÿpq^ - - - bŸarÿ^k] of all the gods and humans.”2 Yet, it is
not her superlative knowledge, but her potential offspring that Zeus
seems initially to recognize as a threat to his newly established rule:
For it had been arranged that from her, children surpassing in wis-
dom would be born, first the grey-eyed girl, Tritogeneia [Athena],
and she is equal to her father in strength and sage counsel; but
then indeed Y^‰qào ¢mbfq~ åo^[ a son to be king of gods and humans
was to be born, and his would be a heart of overwhelming might
[Âmùo_flk]. (Theog. 894-8)
Metis is a threat to Zeus not in her own right but because of her repro-
ductive power. Indeed, the text is yet more specific, for her ability to
generate a daughter equal in both strength and wisdom to Zeus seems
not to imperil the stability of the regime. Rather, the order falters only
in the face of the possible birth of a son. The text sets this possibility off
from the discussion of Athena and gives it special emphasis with the
words, ^‰qào ¢mbfq~ åo^—“but then indeed” . . . a son. It is as if only
here, where the strength of Zeus combines with the knowledge of Metis
in the figure of the son, that the regime begins to tremble. For while
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the strength of Athena is equal to that of her father, it is not said to
surpass his; but the son is to have a “heart of overwhelming might
[Âmùo_flk].” Zeus pre-empts this threat of force with force of his own.
Facing the prospect that Metis would give birth to such a son, he acts
to secure his sovereignty by putting Metis “down into his belly [†phá,
qvbql kea·k]” (Theog. 899).
The masculine logic of force that is the paternal legacy of Zeus culmi-
nates in this act of subversion by absorption. In swallowing Metis, Zeus
accomplishes what his father and grandfather could not: He takes full
possession of the feminine dimension of the generative process, and in
so doing secures his own ultimate autonomy. This act of consumption is
at once Zeus’ ultimate act of political assumption and the culminating
action of Theogony. The narrative structure of Theogony itself is driven
in large part, but not exclusively, by the logic of force in which each
new generation seeks to secure its own hegemony by suppressing the
generation to come. By closing this pattern of generational suppression
in on itself, Zeus takes full control of the generative process so that no
other should “hold kingly honor over Zeus” (Theog. 892).3 This act of
assumption marks the final transition in Theogony from its radically
unstable, ambiguous, and open inception in Chaos, who bore dark
Erebos and black Night (Theog. 123), to the stable order of the regime
instituted by Zeus. What begins in darkness and with a surplus of fem-
inine fecundity, with Gaia generating from herself Ouranos, the sky,
grandfather of Zeus, “her equal in every dimension” (Theog. 126-7),
ends in a surplus of masculine fecundity, with Zeus generating from his
head Athena, virgin goddess of war and justice, “equal to her father in
strength and sage counsel” (Theog. 896).4
Yet there is more to this myth than the deployment of force against
force. To read it as simply one more story of the father’s attempt to
secure his kingship against the claims of the son is to reinforce the
masculine narrative the story of Metis renders so powerfully ambigu-
ous. Metis is indeed the very condition for the possibility of Zeus, not
only of his authority as king, but of his very appearance on the scene of
divine politics. Faced with a husband who consumed each of his chil-
dren as it “came from the womb [kea·lt] of its mother to her knees”
(Theog. 460), Rheia asked her parents, Gaia and Ouranos, “to think of a
j´qft,” some plan by which she could give birth to a son (Theog. 471).
Zeus was born, quite literally, by j´qft. Here, j´qft takes on the sense
of aÏilt, trickery or deception, which it often has within the economy of
patriarchal domination. This is the sense it has for Prometheus who is
said to be ädhlirj©qft (crooked-counseling), when in full awareness he
perpetrates his ali÷et qùuket (artful deception) by presenting Zeus
with the white bones of an ox, saving the meat and fat for humans
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(Theog. 445-6). The conflict between Zeus and Prometheus is in fact
marked by a duality of j´qft: it sets the royal j´qft of Zeus intent on
maintaining firm control of the ruled against the technical j´qft of
Prometheus designed to win for the ruled a degree of self-sufficiency.5
Here j´qft is bound up with the capacity to undermine the authority
of the patriarch and to act on behalf of the oppressed. From the per-
spective of the patriarch, this sort of j´qft is dangerous trickery that
cannot go unpunished. The punishment chosen by Zeus is ironic
indeed; for he has Athena introduce into human-being the “beautiful
evil,” the h^iÌk h^hÏk that is woman (Theog. 585). He has the daughter
of Metis give humans the gift of j´qft; for throughout Greek literature,
women are depicted as creatures of j´qft who, deprived of a voice in
politics, resort again and again to trickery and deception in the face of
the forces of the patriarchy.
So j´qft is duplicity, crafty threat to kings, and hope to the oppressed;
yet it is also the vehicle by which patriarchal sovereignty is won and
the power by which it is sustained. Zeus himself consolidates his
authority by swallowing Metis, but he accomplishes this only through a
certain j´qft: “deceiving her perception by trickery [aÏiø] and slippery
words, he put her down into his belly [†pháqvbql kea·k]” (Theog. 889-
90). Even before consuming her, Zeus seems to possess a powerful
capacity for j´qft capable of deceiving Metis herself. Indeed, the
Theogony expresses the ambiguity of j´qft in its relation to Zeus in a
provocative way. Not only does Zeus deploy j´qft to consume Metis and
bring her ultimately under his authority, but his very ability to estab-
lish his rule in the first place is predicated on a cunning political acu-
men that is closely associated with the feminine power of j´qft. 
In order to defeat the Titans, Zeus heeds the advice of his grand-
mother, Gaia, who not only helps devise the j´qft for Rheia that condi-
tions the very birth of Zeus, but who also sets the succession of
patriarchal authority into motion in the first place by means of the
“evil, treacherous plan” that allows Kronos to castrate his father as he
came to her desiring love (Theog. 160f.). Acting now on behalf of her
grandson, Gaia impresses upon Zeus the need to persuade the hun-
dred-arm giants to fight with him against Kronos (Theog. 628). To do
this, Zeus turns to the powers of two of the sisters of Metis, the
Oceanids Peitho, persuasion, and Styx, the oath of the immortals, and
so, the one who ensures promises are kept and honors respected.6 First,
in accord with Styx, Zeus makes a promise to any Titan willing to fight
on his side that he will respect and maintain the honor (qfj©) of each
and that any god who was dishonored by Kronos would, under him, be
raised to a position of honor as it is just (vùjft) (Theog. 388-96). The
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oath of Styx is part of an overall strategy for political victory that
moves the regime of Zeus decisively beyond the economy of force that
animated the actions of his father and grandfather. No longer will
authority be maintained by force, now it will be won, legitimized and
sustained by a set of promises made with an eye to justice (vùjft).7 Zeus
wins the loyalty of the hundred-arm giants and thus, ultimately, vic-
tory over the Titans because of this promise articulated with Peitho,
sustained by Styx and enacted by a capacity for j´qft Zeus inherits
from Gaia, his grandmother, through Rheia, his mother. The ultimate
stability and legitimacy of his regime depends, then, on a set of powers
associated with feminine deities that move divine politics beyond the
masculine logic of force.
In the end—indeed, from its inception—patriarchal dominion is
unsustainable; for power cannot be maintained by force. Hannah
Arendt has articulated the meaning of power for which force is no sub-
stitute: 
Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted
company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where
words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and
deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations
and create new realities.8
Patriarchal dominion destroys the possibility of genuine political power,
for its deeds are brutal, its intentions veiled. Power, if it is to be politi-
cal, is an ability to hold oneself open to the legitimate claims of others
and to respond with an imaginative creativity that is capable of weav-
ing difference into community with an eye toward justice.
From this perspective, we might hear the story of Zeus’ consump-
tion of Metis and his assumption of power not simply as one more in a
long line of stories in which the masculine subverts the feminine in
order to maintain and legitimize patriarchal authority,9 but as the birth
of a new possibility for politics that manifests itself in the figure of
Athena.
She is the daughter of Metis, but she inherits a certain j´qft too
from her paternal grandmother and great-grandmother. Athena
embodies that habit of thinking bound to the complex ambiguities of
political community, attuned to deception, but guided always by a
sense of justice. In what we have inherited as the story of the marriage
of Zeus and Metis in Theogony, Zeus puts Metis “down into his belly
[†pháqvbql kea·k], so that this goddess should think with him [prj,
coápp^fql] good and evil” (Theog. 900).10 The text is rife with nuance:
Zeus “puts her down [†pháqvbql] into his belly” in the middle voice, and
one begins to wonder how unwilling Metis herself was to go down into
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the very body of the sovereign. Perhaps she colludes in her own
descent. After all, Zeus is able to deceive her by slippery words, a j´qft
that Metis herself may have discerned. The middle voice hints at the
possibility, even as it also emphasizes the extent to which Zeus con-
sumes Metis for his own benefit—for such is the reflexive power of the
middle voice which turns its object back in upon the subject. And then
there is this word prjcoápp^fql, which means to take counsel with, to
debate, consider, or contrive together with someone and so suggests a
kind of communal habit of thinking enacted between Zeus and Metis.11
Would it then be so strange to consider that it was together with
Metis that Zeus decided to turn his attentions next to Themis as a sec-
ond wife, so closely tied as she is to the powers associated with his
first? And then there is Athena, born from the head of Zeus himself,
who enacts the good and evil thought together by her parents. It is she
who with her half-sister, Dike, born of Themis and Zeus, opens the pos-
sibility for human flourishing in a city founded not upon violence, but
upon the powers associated with the sisters of her mother, Peitho and
Styx, the powers of persuasion and respect for honor. To discern the full
complexity of Athena’s attempt to found a city capable of cultivating
genuine human flourishing, it will be necessary to attend to another
story, that told in Aeschylus’s Oresteia about the breakdown of the poli-
tics of force and the birth of another politics.
Listen, then, again to the story of another father and his daughter
caught up in the politics of force at the root of patriarchal authority,
and to what becomes of a king whose sovereignty ultimately succumbs
to the violence born of its own violent inception. 
2. Agamemnon and Iphigenia: The Monstrous Inception of
Patriarchy
When Artemis ordered the winds to hold the ships at Aulis back from
Troy, Calchis, the seer, gave voice to “another, heavier remedy” and the
sons of Atreus threw down their staves, unable to hold back their
tears.12 The patriarchy itself was felt to buckle under the weight of this
“heavier remedy,” for it placed the king, Agamemnon, in an intractable
double bind—and he knew it: 
Heavy is my fate if I do not obey, but heavy too, if I slaughter
[a^÷gs] my daughter, delight of my house, by maiden sacrifice,
staining these father’s hands with rivers of blood beside the alter.
What of these things is without evils? How shall I become a
deserter [ifmÏk^rt] and fail my allies? For if this sacrifice, this vir-
gin blood, stops the winds, it is right [vùjft] for them to desire it
with fervor, most fervently [Ôodî mboflodÕ p<c~> †mfvrjbÿk]. May
all be well. (Agam. 206-17)
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What begins in tears, ends in hope as Agamemnon the king sacrifices
himself as father in the name of Themis and the violent anger of his
allies. The recognition of the ineluctable double bind that presses down
upon him and his regime at the start of this passage shifts, like the
winds themselves, in the moment of decision. The passage describes
two mutually exclusive possibilities, its vocabulary is severe: either
there will be a slaughter and bloodstained hands, or desertion and fail-
ure. Yet, Agamemnon hardly considers the latter before embracing the
sacrifice as something right to desire. That which will secure and legit-
imize his sovereignty has already been posited as “right,” vùjft. 
Although, it has often been insisted that the king has no real choice
in the matter, that he is caught up in a logic of divine retribution that
sets the command of Zeus against that of Artemis;13 that the winds of
Aulis were already wasting away the flower of the Argives, and without
the sacrifice all would die (Agam. 185-98);14 that, indeed, the yoke of
necessity forced his hand against his daughter; yet none of this cap-
tures what is most poignant about the passage: how quickly he comes
to collude in the decision. The chorus anticipates the manner of
Agamemnon’s collaborative response to the “heavy remedy” when they
describe how he held himself in relation to Chalcis and the calamity
that was facing the ships at Aulis: there he stood “not blaming any
prophet, blowing along with [prjmkùsk] the sudden events that struck
him” (Agam. 186-7).15 Although these words appear before Agamemnon
has heard the whole of what will befall him (for Chalcis has not yet spo-
ken of the sacrifice), already he is not inclined to rage against his fate,
but rather, to blow along with it. This is not a matter of divine coercion,
but of his own “character,” his ¢vlt—and as such, it carries blame.
The same metaphor of blowing/breathing (mkbÿk) is used to describe
the change of mind Agamemnon undergoes in the moment of decision:
When he put on the strap of the yoke of necessity, breathing the
changing-wind of his heart [cobkÏt - - - qolm^÷^k], sacrilegious
[arppb_´], impure [åk^dklk], impious [äk÷bolk], at that moment,
he decided to think the most audacious thing. (Agam. 218-21)16
The decision is necessary, but nevertheless impious—and the chorus
underscores the latter, surrounding the “most audacious thing” with
three words signifying that which is unholy. What from the divine per-
spective must be, is, from the human, monstrous. Yet, it is Agamemnon
who acts: he puts on the strap of the yoke of necessity; he breathes into
his heart the very changing wind that holds them back from Troy. He
takes it into himself and makes it his own by deciding to think this
most audacious thing. The decision, however, is said already to carry
the imprimatur of vùjft. It is justified even as it is being made. Neither
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Agamemnon nor his regime could abide the searing tension of the
tragic situation into which they are thrust: almost immediately,
Agamemnon turns his desire to the single law that will secure his
authority, eclipsing completely the legitimacy of that other law, the law
that presses in upon him as father. What Reiner Schürmann calls
Agamemnon’s “tragic denial”17—the decisive turning away from the law
of the family to the divine law as the only legitimate law—is the found-
ing moment of his patriarchal sovereignty.
The patriarchy is founded upon the sacrifice of a singular female,
the daughter of the king who must now be named: Iphigenia. Schürmann
puts it this way:
In the name of the city, which he elevates to the rank of sovereign
meaning, he obliterates “there, that singular.” He consolidates the
union between commander and his troops. The law, uniformly obli-
gatory, emerges in the sacrificial rapture. Tragic denial is neces-
sary for the univocal law to be born.18
Upon what delusion is this denial possible? Upon what habit of think-
ing? The chorus is not silent on this either:
For shameless contrivance [^ŸpuoÏjeqft] emboldens mortals, suf-
fering, deranged first cruelty, and thus, he took it upon himself to
become the sacrificer [vrq©o] of his daughter, leading a woman-
avenging war, a wedding-sacrifice [molqùibf^] for the fleet. (Agam.
221-7)19
The chorus speaks of a shameful j´qft that allows the m^q©o to become
vrq©o, the father to be made sacrificer. Here j´qft still names a deci-
sively transformative habit of thinking; it too continues to carry the
sense of cunning and trickery, but it now also takes on the dimension of
delusion and deranged madness. The patriarchy is born of this delusion
and sustained by it.
But the chorus does not permit us to fall victim to the delusions of
the patriarch; they insist upon the details: ignoring her pleading cries
of “father,” he prayed, then ordered his men to lift her, prone, as if a
she-goat (ufj^÷olt); she fell at his feet, pleading with all her heart; he
ordered them to hold back her voice with a guard (Agam. 227-37). The
institution of the patriarchy is predicated on this silence and the substi-
tution that makes it possible; no other law now can be heard and the
daughter becomes a beast. 
Then: “with force of bit, in silence secured by strength, pouring her
saffron veil to the ground, she struck her sacrificers each in turn with
her eyes’ arrows of pity; as if a figure in paintings, she was striving to
address them [molpbkkùmbfk]” (Agam. 238-42).20 And although the cho-
rus turns away—“the next things I saw not nor speak it”—we are left
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with a powerful rejoinder to the shameful j´qft by which Agamemnon
took it upon himself to sacrifice his daughter to secure his own
sovereignty. For Agamemnon’s j´qft is met by another j´qft: it is the
cunning and craft of Iphigenia, who seems somehow to be able to pour
her saffron veil upon the ground so as to speak with her eyes, entreat-
ing each of her sacrificers to consider the cost of war and the patriar-
chal dominion that makes it possible. The gesture is eloquent: the veil
that signifies modesty and submission, is removed, just as a bride
removes her veil to look directly at her new husband and his guests.21
She sheds her sense of shame and pierces each man in turn with her
“eyes’ arrows of pity” that cleave the moment of decision on which the
patriarchy rests. With her eyes, Iphigenia articulates the tragic fissure
at the very foundation of all patriarchal authority, a fissure in the face
of which Agamemnon sheds tears, only then, quickly, to repress as
anathema to the univocal law that at once institutes and legitimizes his
regime.
Agamemnon embodies this patriarchal law, literally, breathes it into
himself. Roberto Calasso puts it this way: 
Agamemnon, åk^g äkao¬k, king of men, is kingship itself. As
such, he must preside over relations with heaven and earth. It is on
him that all exchanges converge. . . . The person who controls the
mechanism of exchange, the king, is that unique person who must
sacrifice the uniqueness of every other, including his daughter. But
this one master of exchanges, prince of substitutions, may in turn
be attacked by uniqueness.22
Iphigenia will not be substituted; she is no goat and her silence no
silence. She too is a daughter of Metis insofar as both her parents are
said to operate with a certain j´qft. If Agamemnon acts with a “shame-
ful j´qft” that allows him to sacrifice his daughter, Clytemnestra, the
chorus reports, acts with a jbd^iÏjeqft—a great, mighty or even vio-
lent cunning—when she plans and enacts the sacrificial murder of her
husband in retribution for the camouflaged murder of Iphigenia. In
these two cases, j´qft remains deceptive, duplicitous, and violent,
marking either the deranged delusion that enables the foundational act
of patriarchal authority or the cold calculation of the act that signals its
ultimate demise.23 In both cases, however, the power of j´qft trans-
forms human politics, illustrating the deficiencies of one politics and
opening up the possibilities of another.
The j´qft of Clytemnestra is as caught up in the logic of violence as
that of Agamemnon. Strikingly, however, both appeal to a certain jus-
tice to legitimate the actions they perform under the influence of j´qft.
For Agamemnon, the appeal is to a divine vùjft, an immortal order of
justice beyond the domain of mortals.24 As sovereign, Agamemnon controls
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the economy of exchange between the divine order and its manifesta-
tion in the human community. By managing this exchange, the patri-
arch brings the human order under his control. Thus, it is decisive for
the efficacy of the patriarchy to locate its ultimate source of authority
in the natural order of things—in an origin beyond the power of human
politics. Yet Clytemnestra too appeals to a certain vùjft, albeit one more
intimately bound up with a÷he, and so with the actions of mortals in the
world of human community.25 Clytemnestra exhorts the elders of Argos
thus: “Now hear you this, the justness [vùjfk] of my solemn oaths: by the
accomplished Justice of my child [q™k qùibflk q´t †j´t m^faÌt B÷hek], by
Ruin [Å?qek] and Fury [~Cofk·k], for whom I sacrificed [¢pc^g] this man”
(Agam. 1431-3). Clytemnestra’s oaths, like Agamemnon’s most fervent
desire, appeal to the same ultimate authority: vùjft. In so doing, she
calls the very principle of the patriarchy into question. She sets vùjft
against vùjft in order to uncover another dimension of justice: “the
accomplished a÷he of my child.” The transition from vùjft to a÷he shifts
the locus of authority from the divine to the human, from the general to
the singular, from the father to the daughter.
If this transition is anticipated by Iphigenia’s insistent resistance, it
is initiated by her mother’s sacrifice of the sovereign. Yet, the initiation
enacted by Clytemnestra fails ultimately to transform patriarchal poli-
tics because it is predicated on the very violence to which it is opposed.
The end of Agamemnon announces not a new politics, but the assump-
tion of a female patriarch. Where Agamemnon stood, having mobilized
divine vùjft to legitimize his sacrifice of the singular for the sake of the
whole, now stands Clytemnestra, having appealed to the a÷he of the
singular to justify her violence and accomplish her own sovereignty.26 In
blurring the strict boundaries between the feminine and the masculine,
the appearance of the female patriarch anticipates the possibility of
another politics, though it does not accomplish it. For this, a return to
the daughter of Metis is required, for only Athena is able to rise above the
politics of violence and chart a path between the anarchic a÷he of the
singular and the despotic vùjft mobilized on behalf of the patriarch.
Listen, then, again to a final story about the inception of a political
order that at once repeats certain dimensions of the dialectic of patriar-
chal dominion even as it opens the possibility of another politics.
3. Athena and the Erinyes: Metis and the Politics of the
Between
At a crucial moment in Eumenides, Apollo—that god of light and rea-
son—articulates the founding myth of patriarchal sovereignty. Arguing
that the Erinyes have no justifiable claim on the life of Orestes for
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killing his mother, Clytemnestra, Apollo says: “The one called mother is
no parent [qlhb·t] of her child, but only nurturer of the newly sown
embryo. He who mounts [vo¿fphsk] begets [q÷hqbf], whereas a stranger
she preserves a stranger’s seed” (Eum. 659-61).27 In consolidating the
meaning of parent (qlhb·t) by identifying it exclusively with the father,
Apollo enacts a fourfold subversion of the feminine.28
First, he silences the immediate claims of the Erinyes, those god-
desses of old, who are in Aeschylus daughters of the Night (Eum. 416),
but who in Hesiod are born as the irrepressible excess of that original
act of castration by which Kronos, for the first time, establishes patriar-
chal dominion (Theog. 185).29 In the Eumenides, the Erinyes defend the
rights of the mother against the transgression of the son. So, in silenc-
ing them, Apollo also subverts the legitimacy of Clytemnestra’s asser-
tion that killing Agamemnon was done with justice. To silence the
mother, however, is to silence again the voice of the daughter; for in
rejecting the law that underwrites Clytemnestra’s act of retribution,
Apollo implicitly reinforces the legitimacy of that original act of vio-
lence by which Agamemnon trades his daughter for a kingdom.
And there is a fourth subversion of the feminine at work here as
well, for to strengthen the authority of his words, Apollo appeals to
Athena as a sure sign (qbhj©oflk) that a father can generate without a
mother: “Here she stands as witness, the daughter of Olympian Zeus,
who was not even nurtured in the darkness of a womb [k©arlt], for in
no way could a goddess bring such a child to birth” (Eum. 663-6). With
these words, Apollo seeks to set Athena apart from the Erinyes: if they
are ancient goddesses of an ancient goddess, daughters of Night who
occupy a place underground, indeed, a “sunless darkness” (arp©iflk
hkùc^t) (Eum. 395), Athena is no child of the dark, has no mother and
belongs to a new generation of Olympian gods. And yet, the word kea·t
(“womb” but also “stomach”) betrays Apollo; for it gestures to that other
story of Athena’s birth, to the kea·t of Zeus, and to the mother Apollo
so eagerly seeks to elide. Metis operates at gut level, in the very belly of
the patriarch—the site of darkness and gestation and hunger.30 She,
like Iphigenia, sets to work the moment the patriarchy feels itself
sated, its hunger for mastery legitimized and its authority set upon a
stable law.
At first Athena seems to betray her mother, colluding in the mascu-
line logic of patriarchal dominion and the subversion of the feminine on
which it is based. She acquits Orestes with the words: “There is no
mother who gave birth to me, and except for marriage, I always
approve the male, for I am with all my heart very much on the side of
my father” (Eum. 736-8).31 Athena’s virginity symbolizes this ultimate
loyalty to her father; yet her description of her own birth is at once lit-
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erally true—no mother gave birth to her—and suggestively misleading.
On the surface, it seems to resonate with Apollo’s contention that no
goddess nurtured her; yet, Athena’s own words here simply describe
her paternal birth. Her actions, however, bespeak a loyalty also to her
mother. Zeus and Metis think together (prjcoápp^pv^f) in their
daughter, informing her actions throughout Eumenides as she seeks to
establish a court on the Areopagus rooted in the human capacity for
a÷he and capable of cultivating genuine human flourishing.32
This requires, as Athena seems to recognize from the start, a habit of
political thinking fundamentally different from both the cold calcula-
tion of Clytemnestra and the deranged delusion of Agamemnon. Where
they turn to violence in an attempt to legislate their own legitimacy,
Athena turns to honor, respect, and persuasion. Where theirs is a logic
of hubris, blindness, and subversion incapable of tolerating the ambigu-
ities endemic to politics, hers is a logic of humility, imagination, and
respect capable of weaving justice into the fabric of human community.
Athena does not seize power, she is offered it, having gained the con-
fidence of those over whom she will rule. She begins in the openness of
wonder and with a question: “[W]ho are you? I speak to you all alike,
both you, the stranger kneeling at my image here, and you, who are
like nothing ever generated from seeds” (Eum. 407-10). This openness
draws first the confidence of the Erinyes. When Athena explicitly asks
them to turn authority in the case over to her, they readily agree; for
the request itself carries with it a respect for the authority the Erinyes
originally claim for themselves (Eum. 434-5).33 Orestes, for his part,
stakes his claim upon Apollo and yet he too is willing to accept the
authority of Athena’s decision (Eum. 465-9).
Having come to power by respect, Athena reigns with humility. “The
matter is too big for any mortal who thinks he can judge. Nor is it right
[vùjft] for me to determine cases of murder where wrath is swift” (Eum.
470-2). Unlike Agamemnon who immediately mobilizes vùjft on his own
behalf in an attempt to render the equivocal law univocal, Athena
affirms the ambiguity of vùjft itself: Orestes is blameless, but the
Erinyes “have their allotted function too” (Eum. 476).34 She allows the
two sides to press in upon her: “Both together—[for the Erinyes] to stay
or [for me] to send them away—are difficult without my incurring
wrath” (Eum. 481-2).35 If Orestes is acquitted and the Erinyes sent
away, Athena will see her land sickened to death, the soil infected—
indeed, the Erinyes themselves promise anarchy: “I will unleash all
manner of death” (Eum. 478-9, 502). If, on the other hand, her suppli-
ant Orestes is denied help, Apollo has promised the fearsome wrath of
the gods (Eum. 233-4). Yet this divine wrath is perhaps not as compelling
for her as is the recognition that the cycle of retributive violence upon
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which the patriarchy rests destroys the possibility of human flourish-
ing. She cannot but incur wrath, but perhaps she can transform force
into power.
Although the words by which she acquits Orestes seem to reinforce
the logic of patriarchal dominion right down to its attempt to arrogate
for the male the generative process itself, the words by which Athena
charges the jury resonate with the concerns the Erinyes themselves
voice. The Erinyes had warned of the dangers that arise when all fear
of reprisal disappears: it is the life of anarchy. Yet, they advise too
against the life of despotism, insisting that “the in-between has the
power.” “Hubris,” they say, speaking a “measured word,” “is the very
child of impiety [arppb_÷^t], but beloved and desired prosperity is born
of a healthy heart [cobk¬k]” (Eum. 517-37). The words call to mind
Agamemnon’s moment of decision when he “breathed the changing-
wind of his heart [cobkÏt], sacrilegious [arppb_´],” and dared to think
the most audacious thought that enabled him to found his regime upon
the cut throat of his daughter (Agam. 218-21).36 Prosperity, say the
Erinyes, is born not of that deranged impiety, but of the healthy heart
that animates the power of the between. It is strange perhaps to hear
such measured words of health and prosperity from deities that are
explicitly thematized as vile and monstrous.37 Yet Athena echoes pre-
cisely these sentiments in charging the jurors of the Areopagus: “I
counsel my citizens to maintain and practice reverently neither anar-
chy nor despotic rule, and not to cast the fearsome [qÌ abfkÏk] entirely
from the city” (Eum. 696-8). The term—qÌ abfkÏk (the fearsome)—
should be taken to refer both to the fear that stems the tide of anarchy
and to the Erinyes themselves—the fearsome embodiment of retribu-
tion. Athena then, can be heard here to endorse both the Erinyes and
their politics of the between.
Contrary to what the words of her actual judgment in the case seem
to suggest, in the end, Athena enacts this politics of the between.
Immediately upon hearing Athena’s verdict, Orestes and Apollo depart
and the actual founding of the city is left to the women. Athena feels
the full force of the Erinyes’ wrath: they will contaminate the soil ren-
dering both the land and its people barren (Eum. 778f.). Although she
does not fail to remind the Erinyes of her access to her father’s thun-
derbolt, Athena responds not with force, but with persuasion, respect,
and honor. She begins directly, in the second person singular, with an
imperative, but in the middle voice: “Let yourself be persuaded by me
. . . you have not been beaten. This came truly from a just and equal
ballot. There is no dishonor for you” (Eum. 794-6). She continues,
respectfully, but with confidence: “I will bear your angers; for you are
older and in this you are wiser [plcsqùo^], and yet, Zeus gave me
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intelligence [colkbÿk] too, not to be spoiled” (Eum. 848-50). If the
Erinyes excel in wisdom, Athena has inherited a certain political intel-
ligence—a coÏkepft—that is capable of responding to the contingencies
and ambiguities endemic to life in the polis. Her response to the
Erinyes illustrates the power of this political intelligence that retains
its fundamental relation to that more original habit of thinking associ-
ated with her mother and grandmothers: j´qft.
Athena’s words do not part company with her deeds; they are
informed by actions that establish rather than violate relations: she
grants the Erinyes honor by expanding the scope of their authority and
the degree to which they will be praised.38 She offers them a privileged
status in the city: no longer will their authority be limited to pursuing
and punishing those guilty of murdering their own blood relatives
(Eum. 264-75, 334-40), but now “no household will prosper” without
their will (Eum. 895); they will manage the entirety of human affairs
(Eum. 930-1); indeed, the scope of their authority will extend to the
immortal gods and the gods underground (Eum. 950-5). And the
Erinyes allow themselves to be persuaded, for ultimately, they too rec-
ognize that the law of violence cannot cultivate their “beloved and
desired prosperity” (Eum. 536-7). Thus, they redirect their wrath
(jbv÷pq^j^f hÏqlr) (Eum. 900),39 placing it on the side of the city, and
settle into their new home beside Athena (Eum. 916), at the very root of
human community.
The manner in which Athena weaves the Erinyes into the life of the
polis echoes the way Zeus incorporates the Titans into his divine
regime in the Theogony. Where he turns to Styx and Peitho, the sisters
of Metis, to grant honor to the elder Titans and to persuade them to put
their strength in the service of vùjft, she turns to Zeus and Peitho to
grant honor to the elder Erinyes and to persuade them to serve a city
directed toward a÷he. And yet, at this late date, we have barely learned
to practice that habit of political thinking that makes this weaving pos-
sible. However, this habit of thinking is already discernible in the very
texts that articulate the dialectic of patriarchal dominion and the logic
of force that continue to dominate human politics with ever more
destructive consequences. These stories, however tragic, prefigure the
lived tragedies enacted by those who, like Agamemnon, respond to the
complex ambiguities of human political life in blindness and with arro-
gance, positing a rigid conception of retributive justice as the univocal
law of political authority. Yet by attending to the manner in which
Zeus and Athena respond to the inherently unstable economy of retri-
bution in the stories we have inherited, another possibility for politics
emerges.
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If patriarchal dominion operates according to the masculine econ-
omy of violence, this other politics would need to articulate an androgy-
nous economy of power in the Arendtian sense. It would require the
cultivation of that transformative habit of political thinking we have
traced through the shifting terrain that is j´qft. Such a transformative
habit of thinking involves a constellation of capacities that are difficult
to sustain in the face of the disconcerting contingencies endemic to
human political life. A condition for its possibility is ethical imagina-
tion, an ability to imagine one’s way into the position of the other so as
to discern the most effective ways to address the legitimate concerns
voiced there. Its locus is the precarious space between competing claims
for justice, the site upon which such claims converge. Its practice
requires confidence in the face of irreconcilable differences and the
courage to allow the voices of difference to be heard in all asperity. This
political habit of thinking requires, too, an ability to turn the pressure
of such differences toward a common concern for justice animated by a
recognition that human flourishing cannot be sustained by force. It
entails the capacity to weave such differences together into the fabric of
a community strong enough to bear the weight of difference and flexible
enough to respond with openness and creativity to the tensions
endemic to the play of difference. To allow such a transformative habit
of thinking to inform the action of politics is difficult indeed, though
the stories we have inherited suggest that it is not impossible if only we
are willing to listen.
NOTES
1. Aeschylus, Eumenides, ed. Alan H. Sommerstein, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), ll. 525-9; henceforth Eum., followed by line number.
2. Hesiod, Theogonia, in Theogonia, Opera et Dies, Scutum, ed. Friedrich
Solmsen, Reinhold Merkelbach, and Martin L. West, 3rd ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990), l. 886; henceforth Theog., followed by line
number. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
3. Marylin Arthur beautifully articulates the manner in which Zeus’ actions
close the pattern established in Theogony: “Zeus’ swallowing of Metis is
not so much a ‘next step’ in the succession-struggle, which completes the
pattern at its logical extreme, as it is an act of synthesis which by includ-
ing strategies of the earlier two stages and collapsing them into one, closes
the pattern in upon itself. For, like Ouranos, Zeus suppresses the child in
the mother’s womb; and, like Kronos, he swallows the child itself, by con-
suming Metis when she is pregnant with Athena and about to give birth”
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(“Cultural Strategies in Hesiod’s Theogony: Law, Family, Society,”
Arethusa 15:1-2 [1982], p. 77). 
4. Arthur seems to overstate her case slightly when she says, “[t]he first
birth of the poem is an act of simple re-production: Gaia produces Ouranos
to be ‘equal’ to herself.” Actually, the first birth seems to be that of Erebos,
the dark, from Chaos (Theog. 123). However, she is certainly correct to
draw the striking parallel between the original birth of Ouranos from
Gaia as her equal with the birth of Athena as equal to her father. And fur-
ther, she is correct to see in this birth a token of the legitimacy of Zeus’
patriarchal authority, although this too is problematized by the role Metis
plays in the birth of Athena. Arthur puts it this way: “the last major birth,
that of Athena, produces a child whose resemblance to her father betokens
legitimacy and hence the primacy of patriarchy” (“Cultural Strategies in
Hesiod’s Theogony,” p. 63).
5. See Norman O. Brown, “The Birth of Athena,” Transactions and Proceedings
of the American Philological Association 83 (1952), p. 132.
6. Zeus appoints Styx to be the oath of the immortals and promises her and
her daughters a respected position in his regime (see Theog. 397-403).
7. It is no accident that immediately before the articulation of this agree-
ment, Theogony tells of the births of Rivalry, Victory, Power, and Force as
the children of Styx and Pallas. To set these children apart and yet to
relate them to one another as siblings is to recognize the extent to which
they belong together. To make them children of Styx, however, and to
place them under the control of Zeus is to recognize they cannot be given
free reign to destabilize the order of justice.
8. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958), p. 200.
9. Ann Bergren seems to read the story as one more story of the hegemonic
functioning of patriarchal authority, all of which are essentially the same.
“What varies,” she says, “is the degree to which he [the Greek male]
attempts to demote, divide, or expel the ‘female’ at the same time as he
takes on her powers, and then to proceed as if they had always been his
own” (“Language and the Female in Early Greek Thought,” Arethusa 16:1-
2 [1983], p. 71).
10. By emphasizing the status of Theogony as an inherited text, I mean to
gesture toward the controversial status of the entire text that tells the
story of the marriage of Metis and Zeus. Friedrich Solmsen agrees with a
long tradition of scholars, including Wilamowitz, who take lines 886-900 of
Theogony as interpolation, effectively suppressing the appearance of Metis
and leaving as genuine only the notion that Athena was produced
autonomously out of the head of Zeus (see his Hesiod and Aeschylus
[Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995], pp. 67-8). Here he rehearses the
reasons for taking the passage as inauthentic—it is, for example, inconsis-
tent with what we read in Pindar and with lines 924f. of Theogony itself,
where Zeus is said to produce Athena himself (^‰qÏt). None of these rea-
sons are compelling, however, to Norman Brown, who insists that “the
arguments for excluding these lines are based on the application of inap-
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propriate standards of consistency both to the text of Hesiod and to the
body of Greek mythology” (“The Birth of Athena,” p. 131). Although
Brown’s position is convincing because it is based not on an outdated
obsession with consistency, but rather on a holistic reading of the overar-
ching structure of Theogony, it is advisable to leave it to the philologists to
debate the authenticity of the passage. At present it is enough to empha-
size two points. First, philological interpretation is not itself immune from
the long legacy of patriarchal domination that seeks to control the power
of Metis. And second, the passage in which Metis appears, even if “inau-
thentic,” incisively articulates the manner in which patriarchal dominion
itself is bound up with and depends upon this feminine power of thought.
11. See George Henry Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th
ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), s.v. prjcoáwlj^f. Significantly, this
term appears at Theog. 471, where Rheia asks Gaia and Ouranos j´qfk
prjcoápp^pv^f (“to contrive together a plan”) by which Zeus can be
born. The birth of Zeus thus mimics the birth of his regime insofar as both
are made possible by a communal habit of thinking that involves j´qft.
12. Aeschylus, Agamemnon, ed. John D. Denniston and Denys L. Page,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), ll. 199-200; henceforth Agam., followed
by line number.
13. In their introduction and throughout their commentary, Denniston and
Page insist that Agamemnon cannot be held responsible for his actions
(see esp. introduction to Agamemnon, pp. xxiii-xxix). It is true that Zeus
Xenios forces the sons of Atreus against Troy for Alexander’s violation of
guest-friendship (Agam. 61-2) and that Artemis demands the sacrifice of
Iphigenia as retribution for the murder of a hare and her unborn young
perpetrated, not by Agamemnon, but by the very eagles sent by Zeus him-
self as an encouraging portent (Agam. 107-20). Nevertheless, given the
manner in which the Greeks understood human-being as embedded in a
complex constellation of forces, both divine and human, and that they had
no modern conception of the freedom of the will, it was possible for them
both to see Agamemnon as forced by necessity and yet also responsible
insofar as his own desire is in line with his actions, that is, insofar as he
acts according to his own volition (°h¿k, to use the Aristotelian vocabu-
lary). For an excellent articulation of how tragic decision is caught up both
in the character of the individual and in the power of divine necessity, see
Jean Pierre Vernant, “Intimations of the Will in Greek Tragedy,” in
Tragedy and Myth in Ancient Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (New Jersey:
Humanities Press, 1981), pp. 28-62.
14. Martha Nussbaum puts it this way: “If Agamemnon does not fulfill
Artemis’s condition, everyone, including Iphigeneia, will die” (The
Fragility of Goodness [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986], p.
340).
15. This passage is highlighted by Vernant to emphasize the extent to which
the ultimate sacrifice of his daughter is consistent with his own character
and desire: “By submitting to the thing, without in any way questioning
(`ùdbfk, to blame) the monstrosity of it, the king shows that the life and
love of his daughter cease to count for him the moment they become an
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obstacle to the warlike expedition of which he has assumed command”
(“Intimations of the Will,” p. 49).
16. Note that qolm^÷^ means “a returning wind, alternating wind: one
which blows back from the sea to land” (Liddell and Scott, A Greek-
English Lexicon, s.v. qolm^÷^).
17. Reiner Schürmann, Broken Hegemonies, trans. Reginald Lilly, ed. John
Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), p. 27.
18. Ibid.
19. For justification of molqùibf^ as a kind of wedding sacrifice, albeit here a
corrupt one in which the bride herself is the victim, see David Armstrong
and Elizabeth A. Ratchford, “Iphigenia’s Veil: Aeschylus, Agamemnon
228-48,” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of
London 32 (1985), p. 7.
20. For justification of the translation of hoÏhlr _^cát (“saffron dyes”) as
“saffron veil,” see ibid.
21. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
22. Roberto Calasso, The Marriage of Cadmus and Harmony, trans. Tim
Parks (New York: Vintage International, 1994), p. 115.
23. Both actions are explicitly called “treacherous” or aÏiflt. The chorus
insists that Clytemnestra’s act was done with a hand of treachery (Agam.
1495, 1519), while Clytemnestra claims that Agamemnon too acted with
treachery (1523).
24. Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant emphasize the meaning of
Themis in Theogony: “The omniscience of Themis relates to an order con-
ceived as already inaugurated and henceforth definitively fixed and sta-
ble” (Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, trans. Janet
Lloyd [Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1978], p. 107).
25. In Theogony, the first children of Themis and Zeus are the Seasons
(ÇTo^t), Lawfulness (C‰klj÷ek), Justice (B÷hek), and Peace (CŸo©kek),
all of whom “attend to the actions of mortal people” (Theog. 903). If Wùjft
points to an established order that is stable and fixed, her daughter, B÷he,
is situated squarely in the transitive world of human action and politics.
26. Agamemnon concludes with Clytemnestra fully in charge, subduing the
“vain barking of dogs” that is the argument between Aegisthus and the
chorus of elders by asserting her authority. To Aegisthus, she says, “you
and I rule, we will set this house in good order” (Agam. 1672-3).
27. Note that the verb vo¿phs means “to leap” or “to spring” and carries
the notion of an attack or assault.
28. As Sommerstein suggests, this consolidation of the meaning of qlhb·t
does violence to both the everyday usage of the term and its use elsewhere
in Oresteia (see commentary to Eumenides, pp. 207-8). Apollo’s words
reflect neither Aeschylus’ position nor even that of Greek culture in gen-
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eral, but, put forth in defense of Orestes, they articulate the underlying
logic of domination endemic to the structure of patriarchal authority.
29. Detienne and Vernant argue that Kronos rather than Ouranos is the first
genuine sovereign in Theogony. They claim that Ouranos was driven by
sexual, not political, desire and that until Ouranos is separated from Gaia
by means of Kronos’ sickle, the universe had not yet come into existence
as the organized cosmos that is the site for the political struggles of the
gods over sovereignty (see Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and
Society, pp. 62ff.).
30. Referring to the term d^pq©o in the prooemium of Theogony (26), which,
like kea·t, means both “belly” and “womb,” Marylin Arthur writes that it
“is the floating signifier for every kind of ambiguity which characterizes
the human condition” (“The Dream of a World without Women: Poetics
and the Circles of Order in the Theogony Prooemium,” Arethusa 16:1-2
[1983], p. 104). Metis is at home in the belly where ambiguity reigns.
Recall, too, that the j´qft Gaia and Ouranos think together for Rheia
involves substituting a stone for a child and tricking Kronos to “put it
down into his belly” (†pháqvbql kea·k) (Theog. 487) just as Metis was
put down into the belly of Zeus. In both cases, the patriarchy was trans-
formed by the consumption.
31. Note that the description Athena gives here is similar to that given at
Theog. 925. It is possible to hold together the two stories of the birth of
Athena in Theogony. She was indeed born from the head of Zeus alone—
let us even give the weight to ^‰qÏt at Theog. 925 that Solmsen gives it
when he says that, although it need not carry this weight, it “means
almost the same as ‘alone’” (see Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus, p. 68).
Even so, Athena would have herself been introduced into the very body of
Zeus as he consumed Metis while she was “about to bring forth the god-
dess, grey-eyed Athena” (Theog. 888-9). No mother gave her birth does
not necessarily mean that she had no mother, nor indeed, as Apollo says,
that no goddess nurtured her in the darkness of a womb.
32. That a÷he is at issue between Orestes and the Erinyes is clear from Eum.
433 when the Erinyes enjoin Athena to “judge straight and just [a÷hek].”
That the justice must be fundamentally a human rather than a divine
capacity is clear from Athena’s charge to the citizens who will serve on the
jury not to violate their oath with an unjust mind (Eum. 490). Although
the initial act of judgment that decides the case and establishes the
Areopagus is ultimately given to Athena, she does not cast her ballot until
the human ballots return tied, nor does her divine vote seem to weigh
more than any single human vote. Athena does suggest that the matter is
too big for a mortal to judge, but also that she does not have the vùjft to
decide (Eum. 470-2).
33. For the Erinyes’ claims of authority in cases such as that of Orestes, see
Eum. 311-20 and 381-96.
34. “Allotted function” translates the Greek jlÿo^k which points to an old
order of divinity that assigns this function and these rights to the Erinyes.
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35. This is a difficult passage due to some corruption in the text. My render-
ing follows the logic of Sommerstein in Aeschylus: Eumenides, p. 168.
36. See also Agam. 750-82, where similar language appears.
37. They are initially described as “black and utterly disgusting,” their breath
unapproachable with ooze dripping from their eyes, fit neither for divine
nor human community (Eum. 52-6). Athena herself, although not terror-
ized by them, distances them from both gods and mortals (Eum. 410-3).
38. Rose Cherubin has insightfully emphasized the importance of the expanded
role of the Erinyes as a condition for the possibility of the flourishing of the
city (“The Metaphysics of Justice in Aeschylus’ Eumenides” [Ancient
Philosophy Society, Boston, 12 April 2007]).
39. The verb jbv÷pqejf is significant here: the wrath of the Erinyes is not
dissolved, but turned, placed in another way. Now, it serves the polis, not
the pain of the injured individual.
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